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Abstract
Overleveraging of the banking sector has been considered as one of the main
causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and the subsequent great recession. It was also
of major concern for the subsequent BIS regulatory policies resulting in Basel III
and its request for higher capital requirements. It has now become highly relevant
for the planned European banking union. Overleveraging of the banking sector
exposes the financial sector and the macroeconomy to vulnerabilities, but also, as
critics state, seems to constrain credit flows to the private sector. We present here a
measure of overleveraging, defined as the difference of actual and sustainable debt,
conduct an empirical study on overleveraging for 40 banks in Europe, and study the
vulnerabilities and credit contractions that can arise subsequently. Before the year
2004 overleveraging has not been a serious problem as leverage was on a sustainable
level. However, in the run-up to the financial crisis, actual and optimal debt ran
apart and the banking sector began to suffer from overleveraging. We use a non-
linear Vector STAR model to evaluate the hypothesis that periods of increasing
debt levels are accompanied by more severe credit constraints than periods of low
leveraging. We demonstrate this for country groups across Europe.
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1 Introduction
Excessive leveraging of the banking sector has recently become an crucial topic in eco-
nomics. Many studies have demonstrated that the US financial crisis of the years 2007-09
was caused by excessive leveraging of the US banking sector, its exposure to the US real
estate sector, and the highly non-linear amplification once the banking sector became
vulnerable and inherently unstable after adverse shocks.1 Subsequently, in academic lit-
erature it has been hypothesized that an overleveraged banking sector leads to constraints
in credit supply and recovery slows down.2
The regulatory proposals of Basel III in the years 2009 and 2010 also concentrate on the
excessive leveraging of the banking sector, pointing to the fact that excessive leveraging
makes the banking and financial sector fragile, exposing it to instability and macroe-
conomic amplification. The major remedy suggested by most of the initial proposals
for macroprudential regulation consists of constraining excessive leveraging and build-
ing up capital buffers in the banking sector in good times to be used in bad times (see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision August 2010). The EU is currently designing
a banking union to be overseen by the ECB. Excessive leveraging of EU banks appears
to be a liability for the stability of the future banking union. In preparatory work, ECB
researchers have begun studying the issue (see Clerc et al. 2014).
The role of excess leverage as a driving force for the instability in the financial-real link-
age are studied in many DSGE models. Much of this work is based on the financial
accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999) which exhibits some mean reverting behavior.3 In
other theoretical work, more distant to the DSGE model, a number of studies focus on
how fragile balance sheets of banks and the financial sector are likely to be destabilizing
rather than mean reverting.4 The asset price channel through which the banking system’s
instability is triggered has become essential in those studies. This is strongly stressed by
studies such as Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014), Mittnik and Semmler (2013), and Stein (2012, 2003), to name a few.
In a very stylized view Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) focus on financial experts
representing financial intermediaries. In their view it is a shock to asset prices which
creates a vicious cycle through the balance sheets of the banks, contagion effects and
macro feedback effects. They call it the volatility paradox. When volatility of asset prices
is low, risk taking and borrowing occurs, but low volatility builds up instability. When
prices of assets – held by banks – fall, and therefore their equity value and net worth
fall, the margin requirements for borrowing on the money market rise, forcing financial
intermediaries to take haircuts and to further de-lever to remain liquid. This, in turn,
can lead to a fire sale of assets, further depressing asset prices, decreasing net worth and
thus triggering an endogenous jump in volatility and risk for all, generating a downward
spiral.
In Mittnik and Semmler (2013), the vulnerability of the banks and the downward insta-
1See Brunnermeier (2009) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013).
2This view is, for instance, expressed by Admati and Hellwig (2013).
3The work by Bernanke et al. (1999) studies the asset price movements and the relation to credit
flows, but leaves aside the leveraging dynamics of financial intermediaries.
4See Goodhart et al. (2012).
1
bility is caused by the limited liabilities of decision makers in banks, improper incentive
systems and lack of constraints imposed on financial intermediaries that allow for un-
restricted growth of capital assets (through borrowing).5 On the other hand generous
payouts with no “skin in the game” affect the risk taking, equity formation and leverag-
ing of banks. Higher payouts, for instance, may induce an increasing risk taking behavior,
as well as risk transfer, and generate higher (endogenous) aggregate risk and greater risk
premia for all. In the first instance though, banks may have loan losses that might arise
from defaults of firms, households, the foreign sector, or from sovereign debt. Banks are
substantially affected by financial stress that is triggered by securities price movements,
high risk premia and credit spread, possibly then exposed to strong downward feedback
loops.
In Stein (2012, 2003) the destabilizing mechanism also results from a linkage between
asset prices and borrowing. When assets held by the banking sector tend to be over-
valued, banks enjoy capital gains beside the normal returns, and they start to become
overleveraged as compared to optimally leveraged. This happens when financing costs
for leveraging are low and capital gains are emerging which provides the banks with high
net worth. Actual operating income of banks is then composed of normal returns and
stochastic capital gains. Debt tends to rise with capital gains and excess returns on cap-
ital, generating excessive borrowing (see Stein 2012, Ch.4). This can hold as long as
interest rates are low and credit spreads are small. In fact, empirical studies show that
low interest rates and capital gains are often strongly negatively correlated.6 On the other
hand, in Stein’s view, if capital gains shrink or become negative and credit spreads rise,
actual leveraging turns out to be far above optimal leveraging and the balance sheets of
banks are rapidly deteriorating, triggering downward amplifying effects.
In all three theoretical approaches mentioned above excessive leveraging of the banking
sector is the essential driving force. Such a phase often begins with a period of tranquility
during which financial fragility may nonetheless build up – low or zero risk premia can
still be observed however, as for example in the US from the 1990s to 2007. Implicitly,
the present value and the net worth of banks will tend to become quite large, because
there is no correction through a risk premium.7
When the borrowing bubble bursts and asset price and net worth fall, and risk premia and
credit spread rise, reducing lending, borrowing and financial intermediation, the process
reverses. Banking vulnerability and the actual reverse process will of course also depend on
other co-variates, such as a sudden rise of the the interbank lending rate, repo rate, a jump
in credit spreads, dissipating liquidity, rise of financial stress and adverse feedback loops
from the macroeconomy to the banks’ balance sheets.8 It is therefore not necessarily the
overleveraging itself that triggers instability, but it is also the financial stress and adverse
feedback loops from real activity to financial intermediaries amplifying this process. The
5This source of instability is also discussed in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
6See Stein (2012, Ch.5). During the real estate boom one could observe low interest rates, risk premia
and discount rates. In turn, low discount rates may generate high asset prices and capital gains.
7To avoid this misperception, Stein (2012, 2003) suggests to make corrections by proposing to take
the trends/drifts in capital gains and interest rates in such a model, that would better measure some
debt capacity.
8For details of such measures of financial conditions and a constructed index, see Schleer and Semmler
(2013).
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latter leads to a fall in banks’ operating income, a fall in net worth and rising banking
stress. Thus, it is eventually this type of banking-macro linkage that will unleash major
amplifying forces, possibly triggering severe downswings.9 A major issue is then how
overleveraging can be measured and tracked empirically so as to obtain early warning
signs.
To undertake an empirical study on those issues, we introduce a new measure of over-
leveraging. If borrowing exceeds debt capacity this can be called excess leveraging. Debt
capacity will be measured as sustainable or optimal debt. In our empirical work, we fol-
low Stein (2012, 2003) and measure overleveraging as leveraging over and above optimal
leveraging. We hereby can show that many banks in Europe became vulnerable to a
banking crisis before the 2007-09 crisis and remained vulnerable afterwards. We use a
non-linear Vector STAR model to evaluate the hypothesis that periods of high leveraging
are accompanied by more severe credit and output constraints than periods of decreasing
leveraging, and demonstrate this for country groups in Europe.
Since overleveraging and the running down of the banks’ net worth appear as the major
cause of the build up of vulnerability of banks and restricted credit flows, the issue of
leveraging constraints10 and raising capital requirements for banks11 has been brought up
by regulatory literature and also by Basel III. Such a regulatory policy is also planned
to be enacted in the euro area after the banking union. Many models used for such
regulatory purposes assume that both net worth and leveraging are measured by stocks.
Then a certain percentage of assets can be defined as the bank’s equity to provide a safety
net for the depositors and creditors of the bank (Clerc et al. 2014). According to Basel
III, the fraction of assets, possibly risk weighted assets, that is required to be held as the
bank’s capital, should be increased to 7% or 8% and even considerable higher in some
proposals.12
As Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Stein (2012) and Mittnik and Semmler (2013)
when studying overleveraging, we follow the above literature in the model variant set out
here and start with a continuous time model. In contrast to Mittnik and Semmler (2013),
Schleer and Semmler (2013), who work with non-linear finance-macro links, we, along the
line of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Stein (2012), employ stochastic processes
in this paper. We will use a novel method called Non-linear Model Predictive Control
(NMPC), as presented in Gru¨ne and Pannek (2011) and Gru¨ne et al. (2013), the latter
using economic discounting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a dynamic model on optimal lever-
aging. Section 3 explains the methodology to empirically measure excess leveraging and
reports the results on overleveraging for banks, countries, and country groups in Europe.
Section 4 applies a regime-switching Vector STAR model to study effects of shocks in good
and bad times of leveraging in the banking sector. Section 5 concludes. The appendices
provide the solution method, derivation of optimal debt and detailed results on EU banks
and countries.
9Recently such feedback loops have been discussed for the euro area where a triangle relationship
between private borrowing, bank leveraging, and sovereign debt has been observed, see Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2013).
10See Christiano and Ikeda (2013).
11See Clerc et al. (2014).
12See Admati and Hellwig (2013) who argue for capital buffers of up to 30%.
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2 Theoretical model
Next, we introduce a model of optimal leverage that helps us to define overleveraging.
The model sketched here is a low-dimensional stochastic variant of a model of banking
leveraging. A model like this can be found in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, sect. I),
and Stein (2012, 2003).
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) apply a more general setting as used here. There are
households that save and financial experts representing financial intermediaries that invest
in capital assets owned by households and financial intermediaries. Both have different
discount rates. The easier access of financial intermediaries to the credit market shifts, in
the long run, the ownership of capital. In our model we will leave out the specifications
of households, the dynamics of the capital stock, its changing ownership, and aggregate
net worth. We focus solely on the behavior of financial intermediaries. Yet, overall, our
model is very similar to Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Stein (2012, 2003). Both
models have leveraging and payouts as a choice variable, and net worth as a state variable,
the latter denoted by x1,t in equ. (2). Moreover, both models are stochastic.
In such a model for financial intermediaries and the derivation of their optimal leveraging,
one uses preferences in the objective function and Brownian motions as state variables.
The Stein (2012) model, assuming certain restrictions for preferences, for example log
utility, allows to exactly compute excess leveraging, see Appendix B. In this section
we focus on the solution of a prototypical stochastic dynamic version that displays the
mechanism of optimal leveraging. In order to solve such a stochastic variant dynamically
through a numerical procedure, for which we use NMPC, we need to stylize a stochastic
shock sequence (see equ. (3)) representing another state variable.
In Stein (2012, Ch.4) the capital return is stochastic due to capital gains and the interest
rate is stochastic as well. In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) only the capital return is
stochastic at first. The interest rate is taken as constant, but later changed referring to
time varying borrowing cost reflecting the expenses for screening and monitoring. Note
also that whereas the Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) model is an infinite horizon
model, the Stein (2012) model is designed for a finite decision horizon.
Both, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Stein (2012) employ a continuous time
version, but we formulate the problem as a discrete time variant with a discounted in-
stantaneous payout ct and an optimal leveraging f t in (1)–(3).
13 The state variables are
given by (2), and the stochastic shock process in equ. (3). We model this as a finite
horizon decision problem, with decision horizon of N , in discrete time, as:
13In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), in their equ. (7), net worth nt is their state variable, and
xt and dct are their decision variables, which are equivalent to xt = 1 + f t and dct = ctx1,t in our
model. Also to be noted, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) include another equation for the evolution
of capital stock arising from a decision variable of investors. We neglect this aspect here, to focus, as
Stein, on the net worth dynamics. Including the additional decision and state variable would make the
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) model again similar to the model of Mittnik and Semmler (2013),
except in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) leveraging is a choice variable.
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V = max
ct,ft
Et
N∑
t=0
βtU(ctx1,t) (1)
s.t.
x1,t+1 = x1,t + hx1,t[(1 + ft)(y + ν1 lnx2,t + r)− (i− ν2 lnx2,t)ft − aϕ(x1,t)− ct] (2)
x2,t+1 = exp(ρ lnx2,t + zk) (3)
Hereby c and f are the two decision variables, with c = C/x1, and f = d/x1, d denoting
debt, h is the step size, y denotes capital gains, driven by stochastic shocks, ν1 lnx2,t. The
return on capital is r, i the interest rate, also driven by stochastic shocks, ν2 ln gx2,t
14,
aϕ(x1,t) are convex adjustment costs, ρ is a persistence parameter, with ρ = 0.9, and zk
is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and a variance, σ = 0.05. We solve the model
(1)–(3) through a stochastic version of NMPC, see Appendix A.
Figure 1 presents the path of the payout ct (red line) and leveraging ft (blue line). Note
that we solve here only for optimal leveraging. As can be observed, the stochastic capital
gains and interest rates generate a volatility of both payout and leveraging. Yet, the
payout fluctuates roughly with the leveraging. In such a model, both Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014) and Stein (2012) assume that in each period the debt is redeemed and,
without cost, frictionless re-obtained on the market.
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Figure 1: Path of optimal payout c (light grey line) and optimal leveraging, x = (1 + f) (grey
line)
14Stein (2012) postulates that the interest rate shocks are highly negatively correlated with capital
gains’ shocks, we have thus a negative sign for the stochastic term in equ. (2) after the interest rate.
We also assume that the interest rate shocks have a smaller variance than the capital gains’ shocks. But
of course, if the perception arises that there is a default risk of certain banks, risk premia on banks’
borrowing will suddenly increase. Both will drive down net worth of banks further, possibly creating a
credit related systemic banking crisis.
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In Figure 2 the black line is the path of net worth and the red line is the process of
stochastic shocks, giving rise to the volatility of the payout and leveraging in Figure 1.
Note that the actual leveraging could be driven by other forces as well (see Sect. 3) and
thus actual leverage can move in a different direction than the optimal leverage.
Figure 2: Paths of net worth (x1,t), modeled by equ. (2) (black line); stochastic process,
modeled by (3) (red line) with initial net worth condition below the stochastic steady state
One should also point out that as the leveraging goes up (see the period from 1 to 25)
the payout and net worth go up. Leveraging, however, could be restricted. This is what
regulatory policy would like to engineer. It can be achieved if leveraging restrictions are
imposed.15 On the other hand, with no leverage restrictions, leverage and payouts are
rising (see the period after iteration 25 in Figure 1). The rising leverage could lead to
the default of a bank or, through contagion effects, of many banks, a process central in
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
Yet, in the current set up we have not modeled default probabilities and default intensities.
They depend not only on the overleveraging of banks but also on liquidity ratios of
banks and macro feedback effects. Moreover, the model above so far tracks only optimal
leveraging, not the actual or excess leveraging. The Stein (2012) model can neatly make
the distinction between optimal debt, actual debt and excess debt. It does not specify
the more precise macro feedback mechanisms that build up excess debt.
The Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) model does this only in a very stylized way
through the fire sale of assets and volatility jumps. To explain such excess debt dynamics
in its feedback to the macroeconomy, recent finance-macro models employed by De Grauwe
and Macchiarelli (2013) and Schleer and Semmler (2013) might be helpful.
The mechanism of debt build up that De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2013) offer is that
with rising prices of the borrowers’ assets (firms, households) and their capital gains,
they become more creditworthy, so that banks are going into the “risk taking channel”,
accepting lower credit spread and lending more, but exposing themselves to a greater
extent to the borrower. However, as aggregate demand rises and the economy expands,
this creates more cash flows and higher equity prices, higher net worth and so on, until
15In the context of our model and our solution method this can be easily done, as in Christiano and
Ikeda (2013), by imposing leverage restrictions on xt.
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the process reverses. For more details of the dynamics of the macro-finance link driving
credit expansions and contractions, see De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2013), Gerali et al.
(2010), and Schleer and Semmler (2013).
3 Overleveraging in the European banking sector
Next, we describe the theoretical derivation of optimal debt and discuss the calculation
and data issues of optimal and actual debt. Then, we present results on actual as well as
optimal debt, our measure of overleveraging, and its evolution over time for the European
banking sector. Besides the derivation of debt for individual banks, we also compute
country-specific and country-group-specific aggregates based on the respective banks for
each country or group.
3.1 Calculation of optimal and actual debt
Let us now measure optimal debt based on the model of Stein (2012) and contrast it to
actual debt of 40 large European banks from 1997 to 2012. The difference between actual
and optimal debt yields a measure for overleveraging or excess debt for each individual
bank.
Optimal debt ratio:
One way to obtain the optimal debt ratio is through the dynamic solution of equations
(1)–(3) of Section 2. The measure of optimal debt can, however, also analytically be
obtained from a model of return-risk trade-off by maximizing the difference between the
return and the risk term (see Stein 2012, Ch.4.9 and Appendix B). Roughly speaking,
the optimal debt ratio is positive only if the return including capital gains exceeds the
risk premium and the interest rate. The optimal debt ratio is not a constant, but rather
varies directly with the return, the interest rate, and a measure of risk. An important
driving force of the optimal debt ratio is the stochastic process representing the capital
gains and interest rates.
Stein (2012) shows how the optimal debt ratio can directly be derived in the simplified
case of logarithmic utility.16 The objective function hereby is log utility of consumption
over a finite horizon and the state variable is a stochastic differential equation for net
worth as defined in equation (4).
dX(t) = X(t)[(1 + f(t))(dP (t)/P (t) + β(t)dt)− i(t)f(t)− cdt], (4)
whereX(t) is net worth17, f(t) ≡ L(t)/X(t) debt over net worth; thus leverage, dP (t)/P (t)
denotes stochastic capital gains or losses, and i(t) the interest rate, also stochastic. As-
sets over net worth are defined as (1 + f(t)), β(t) is trend productivity of capital, and
C(t)/X(t) ≡ c(t) is consumption over net worth, in the derivation, c is taken as given.
The optimal debt ratio f ∗ maximizes the difference between the mean M(f(t)) and risk
16For a complete description of the derivation relying on Model I of Stein (2012) see Appendix B.
17Since we have here only one state variable, we are using X(t) now as net worth.
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R(f(t)) which represents a mean-variance formulation. So we have:
f ∗ = argmax[M(f(t))−R(f(t))] = [(a(t) + β(t)− i)− (σ2p − ρσiσb)]/σ2, (5)
where σ is a risk element given by σ2 = σ2i + σ
2
r − 2ρσiσr, and σ2i is the variance of the
interest rate, σ2r is the variance of capital gains, and ρ defines the correlation of i and r.
In this model variant Stein (2012) assumes that the asset price grows at a trend rate and
there is a deviation from the trend, see equation (6) and for more details Appendix B.
dP (t)/P (t) = (r + α(0− y))dt+ σrdwp (6)
Moreover, β(t) is considered as deterministic. The optimal debt or leverage ratio f ∗(t) is
defined as follows
f ∗(t) = [(r − i) + β − αy(t)− 1
2
σ2r + ρσiσr]/σ
2, (7)
where r denotes capital gains, i the credit cost of banks, β the trend productivity of capital,
and y(t) is the deviation of capital gains from its trend. Then follows the variance term
with the parameters as described above.
Given those measures, one can employ data to derive the optimal debt ratio for the EU
banks of interest. We now give a detailed explanation of the empirical calculation of the
optimal debt ratio, the data used, and discuss conceptional issues. We rely on annual
data as some measures are only available as annual observation (year-end-data). Data is
obtained from Thomson-Reuters-Datastream. Capital gains are calculated as quarterly
growth rates of the stock market capitalization (market cap) of the bank. The market cap
data is given quarterly and computed as the product of the stock market price and the
common shares outstanding. The common shares outstanding are the difference between
issued shares and treasury shares. The market cap is subject to stock market swings.
To eliminate these, and to obtain a smoothed series of capital gains as expected value
of capital gains, a MA(11) is applied to obtain r. By using a MA(11), we include the
previous/next year as well as one month from the year before/after to mitigate exceptional
events occurring just within one year. Thus, we account for price deviations y(t) from the
trend as modeled in Stein (2012), see equation (6).
For i we take the 1-year interbank rate for the home country of each bank. The rate most
likely reflects best the credit costs of banks. The productivity of capital β is calculated
by dividing the bank’s gross income (revenues minus salary) by the banks’ assets for each
period.18 Then, we compute the trend of β (mean over the period 1997–2012). We also
18More precisely, net sales or revenues represent gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts,
returns and allowances. They include but are not restricted to: Interest and fees on loans, Interest on
Federal Funds, Interest on Bank Deposits, Interest on State, County and Municipality Funds, Interest
on U.S. Government and Federal Agencies Securities, Federal Funds sold and securities purchased un-
der resale agreements, Lease Financing, Net leasing revenue, Income from Trading Accounts, Foreign
Exchange Income, Investment Securities gains/losses, Service Charges on Deposits, Other Service Fees,
Trust Income, Commissions and Fees. Salaries and benefits expenses represent wages paid to employees
and officers of the bank. They include but are not restricted to: All employee benefits such as health
insurance and contributions to pension plans.
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calculate the correlation ρ of the capital gains r and the interest rate i over the entire
period. This is then used as a constant value over the period. Similarly, the standard
deviations and variance of the interest rate and capital gains are also constant.
The risk element σ is given as the sum of the variances σ2i and σ
2
r deducting twice the
product of the standard deviation of the interest rate, the standard deviation of capital
gains, and the correlation between them. The optimal debt ratio is then normalized by
calculating the difference between the optimal debt ratio and the mean over the period
and dividing it by the standard deviation.
Actual debt ratio:
The actual debt ratio is calculated as the amount of long-term debt over total assets.19
Again, the actual debt ratio is normalized to match its unit to the one of the optimal
debt ratio.
3.2 Results
Following the above measure, we calculate optimal and actual debt for 40 European banks,
representing the group of the largest banks of 17 countries in Europe.20
In the following, we present results of country groups. There is quite a heterogeneity
to be found across Europe and banks in some EU regions tend to be more fragile than
others. The groups of countries are Europe (EUR), EU, euro area (EA), euro area north
(EA-n), euro area south (EA-s), and the crisis countries (PIIGS), presented in Table 1.21
The aggregates consist of banks belonging to the respective country group. Thereby, each
bank is weighted by its market capitalization with respect to the individual aggregate to
obtain a representative measure. In Appendix C the detailed results for each large bank
in Europe is reported.
Table 1: Country groups
Europe (EUR) AUT, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT, ESP, SWE, CH, UK
EU = EUR without CH and NOR
Euro area (EA) = EU without DEN, POL, SWE, UK
EA north (EA-n) AUT, BEL, FIN, FRA, GER, NLD
EA south (EA-s) ESP, GRE, PRT, ITA
PIIGS = EA-s and IRE
To begin with, the overall picture is unambiguous. Before the year 2004 overleveraging
has not been a serious problem and leveraging was on a sustainable level for most areas
(see Figure 3). However, in the run-up to the financial crisis actual and optimal debt
19Long-term debt includes all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts due within one
year. Assets represent the sum of cash and due from banks, total investments, net loans, customer
liability on acceptances (if included in total assets), investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, real estate
assets, net property, plant and equipment and other assets. Note that we do not use quarterly averages
but year-end stock values. Long-term debt is not available at quarterly frequency for all banks over the
complete time period. To ensure comparability across banks and over time, we stick to annual data.
20The countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The banks
considered are listed in the Appendix C.
21The groups consist of countries belonging to the EUR, EU, etc., but do not necessarily comprise all
countries belonging to the group.
9
increasingly diverged and the banking sector began to suffer from overleveraging (see
Figures 3 and 5). This is particulary pronounced in the periphery countries of the euro
area. It can be considered as a period where the excess debt build up can be interpreted
as an early warning mechanism.22
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Figure 3: Deviation of actual from optimal debt – excess debt – in the banking sector, country
groups
Recently, the difference between actual and optimal debt approaches zero and debt in
the banking sector in the southern part of the euro area appears to converge toward
a healthier level (see Figure 4). Yet, by our measure of overleveraging there is still a
significant amount of vulnerability and fragility for some country groups and specific
banks in certain countries.
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Figure 4: Actual and optimal debt in the banking sector, country groups
In Figure 3, it can also be seen that banks in EA-n left the path of optimal leveraging and
became slightly overleveraged around the period of the dot-com bubble. However, the
comparatively high actual debt level was reduced to a sustainable degree around 2003.
22Alessi and Detken (2014) have used other indicators as early warning signs for the period before
2007-08.
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From 2002 to 2005 the country groups considered featured a reasonable and healthy degree
of leverage such that actual debt is always close to, but never exceeds optimal debt. This,
however, reverses about the years 2005 and 2006. Banks in PIIGS and EA-s countries
start accumulating debt such that in those countries banks became overleveraged already
in 2005—long before the Lehman collapse. For this time period, it can be seen from
Figure 5 that optimal debt clearly decreased which led to a widening gap in the years
2006–2008, indicating larger overleveraging.
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Figure 5: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country groups
For this period, banks in EUR, EU, EA, and the EA-n started to be overleveraged as well.
In contrast to the EA-s and PIIGS, this is primarily due to a decrease of optimal debt,
whereas (normalized) actual debt increased only slightly. However, the banks in those
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areas did not manage to lower their actual debt level to reach or converge to the optimal
one, but rather remained overleveraged for a while, though the degree of excess debt was
lower than in EA-s and PIIGS.
In 2010, overleveraging was eased, yet still the EA-s and PIIGS remainded at the upper
end and EA-n at the lower bound. Then, however, the sovereign debt crisis set in heavily
and actual and optimal debt started to diverge again, with a particularly sharp increase
for the banks in the periphery countries of the euro area. Interestingly, for those countries
both actual and optimal debt ratio expanded in the wrong direction, whereas actual debt
of the banks in the other country groups on average remained identically.
Note, however, that one should always focus on the difference between actual and optimal
debt, which is our measure of interest. Overleveraging was and still tends to be more severe
in banks in EA-s and PIIGS. Both country groups show approximately the same degree
of excess debt. This convergence was likely to be driven by both financial aid and bailout
programs for distressed or insolvent banks. In 2012, the actual debt approaches optimal
debt for all country groups.
4 Empirical analysis based on a non-linear Vector
STAR model
Next, we present some descriptive statistics and stylized facts between overleveraging in
the banking sector, credit provision to the private sector, and economic activity. Then,
we study the relationship by using a Vector STAR (VSTAR) model.
4.1 Descriptives
The virtue of having now time series data on excess leveraging of individual banks is that
we are now able to analyze the link between credit, GDP growth and overleveraging in the
banking sector in European country groups. The motivation of our study in this section
comes from the considerations of Admati and Hellwig (2013) who point out detrimental
effects to credit and output when a certain threshold of the leverage ratio is reached. This
indicates that a banking sector, suffering from overleveraging, constrains credit flows and
makes the real sector more vulnerable. Admati and Hellwig (2013) put forward this
general hypothesis but do not test their view empirically. Yet, this hypothesis relates well
to our measure of overleveraging and motivates our empirical non-linear analysis.
We therefore use a non-linear VSTAR model to study the link between credit and GDP
in economies based on an exogenous regime-determining variable, namely overleveraging,
which is the deviation of actual from optimal debt in the banking sector. Thus, we are
able to distinguish between credit and output effects when either banks in an economy
tend to be overleveraged or when banks tend to converge toward sustainable debt levels
and constrain credit less. Based on our theoretical considerations and the experiences
of the financial and economic crises, we would expect that overleveraging in the banking
sector makes the economy more vulnerable to shocks and, thus, entailing a credit and
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output contraction.23
In general, there seems to be a significant positive correlation between bank lending to
the private sector, namely credit growth, and GDP growth. It is well recognized that a
lower credit growth goes hand in glove with lower GDP growth (Alessi and Detken 2014).
This also holds for all our country groups, see Table 2. The correlation is lowest – but still
positive – for the northern countries. It is more pronounced, however, for the periphery
countries of the euro area, see the EA-s and PIIGS.
Table 2: Correlation between credit, GDP growth and the measure of (over-)leveraging in the
banking sector, country groups
EUR EU EA EA-n EA-s PIIGS
GDP / credit 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.37 0.51 0.52
GDP / leveraging −0.38 −0.36 −0.40 −0.21 −0.48 −0.50
credit / leveraging −0.37 −0.35 −0.33 −0.11 −0.18 −0.20
1998Q1–2012Q4, quarterly data. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5%-level. The
higher leveraging (excess debt), the higher banks’ leverage ratio (actual minus optimal debt).
EUR: Europe; EU: European Union; EA: euro area; EA-n: euro area north; EA-s: euro area
south; PIIGS: crisis countries.
The higher correlation in the southern European countries is also likely to be a result of
the debt crisis in these countries. The credit crunch, triggering adverse effects in the real
economy, has been particularly severe and persistent for the southern part of the euro
area and the crisis countries (PIIGS), respectively.
The positive correlation between credit and GDP growth also holds for most of the indi-
vidual countries except Norway and Switzerland, see Table 3. The correlation is highest
for Spain, and also comparatively high for the other crisis countries. The correlation be-
tween GDP and credit in Germany is, for instance, not pronounced for the time period
under study.
Table 3: Correlation between credit, GDP growth and the measure of (over-)leveraging in the
banking sector, individual countries
BEL GER AUT FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NLD
GDP / credit 0.49 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.46
GDP / leveraging -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.36 -0.32 -0.15 -0.27 -0.42 -0.01
credit / leveraging -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.09 -0.17 0.03 -0.13 0.16
PRT ESP CH UK POL SWE DEN NOR
GDP / credit 0.37 0.72 -0.25 0.42 0.23 0.39 0.21 -0.05
GDP / leveraging -0.47 -0.48 -0.14 -0.05 0.37 -0.25 -0.22 -0.16
credit / leveraging -0.43 -0.18 0.33 -0.15 0.34 -0.03 0.06 0.23
1998Q1–2012Q4, quarterly data. The higher leveraging (excess debt), the higher banks’ leverage
ratio (actual minus optimal debt). Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5%-level.
Focusing on the averages of credit and GDP over the period guides us to another inter-
esting aspect. In Figure 6, the average GDP and credit growth from 1998–2012 for all
countries is depicted. PIIGS, in particular Greece and Portugal, show on average a rather
high credit growth compared to GDP growth. Besides a fairly high positive correlation
23Though the overleveraging of the banking sector can be viewed as the primary mechanism of credit
constrains the entailed rise of risk premia of banks, and increase of borrowing costs is presumably ampli-
fying that mechanism.
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between GDP and credit growth, which might be driven by the reduction in both vari-
ables during or in the aftermath of the crisis, high credit growth seems to be accompanied
by lower GDP growth on average over the whole time period, especially in the countries
which suffered most from the financial and debt crisis.
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Figure 6: Average quarterly GDP and credit growth, 1998q1–2012q1
Having found a correlation between credit and GDP, we want to explore their relation to
overleveraging in the banking sector. Since quarterly data for a number of banks is lacking,
we use annual data for measuring overleveraging. Next, we convert annual frequency of
the leverage measure to quarterly frequency by means of the quadratic match average
method, so that we have all time series data at quarterly frequency. Our suggested
method fits a quadratic polynomial to the series such that the average of the annual and
quarterly series coincide. Later on, we use this series for the VSTAR analysis. This way
we have – for all time series data – a sufficient number of observations for the models to
be estimated.
In general, there is a negative correlation between excess debt (overleveraging in the
banking sector) and GDP growth as well as growth of bank lending to the private sector.
This can be observed in Tables 2 and 3. It indicates that the higher the debt in the banking
sector is, the lower are GDP and credit growth in the countries or country groups under
study (or vice versa).
Note that the negative correlation of the leverage ratio and GDP growth is by far highest
and significant in EA-s and the PIIGS countries.24 The countries from the northern part
of the euro area (EA-n) do not exhibit a significant correlation between GDP and leverage.
There is also a negative link between credit growth and overleveraging which is significant
for Europe, the EU, and the EA. Banks that tend to be overleveraged may constrain
lending. However, before the crisis there were times of overleveraged banks providing
24Note also that excess leveraging is driven by both actual and optimal leveraging. Thus, a jump in
credit costs for refinancing, see the interbank rate spread in Appendix C, in a crisis regime may increase
overleveraging in a period when output falls.
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credit in an unhealthy and excessive way to some sectors. This may explain the negative,
but sometimes insignificant, correlation for most countries in our sample. Yet, a very
clear link can be found for Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which might be particularly
driven by credit crunch.
Overall, there seems to be a relevant relation between overleveraging in the banking sector,
bank lending to the private sector and real GDP growth in European economies. This
appears to be important for the countries which suffer most from the economic crisis
and ran into a (sovereign and private) debt crisis. These descriptive statistics make it
worthwhile to study the link in a more structural way based on a non-linear Vector STAR
model. The VSTAR model is able to distinguish between periods of overleveraging and
sustainable debt levels and the respective consequences for the real economy.
4.2 The Vector STAR model
The VSTAR model is able to distinguish between regimes and to capture different dynamic
properties across regimes. Overleveraging in the banking sector may lead to a contraction
of bank lending, serious contagion effects, adverse feedback loops between the financial
and the real sector, and slow recovery due to decreased credit flows. Hence, we define
two regimes based on our measure for debt in the banking sector: (i) when the banking
system tends to suffer from excess debt (overleveraging), and (ii) when the debt level
tends to converge to a sustainable level. We thus use an exogenous variable to estimate
the threshold of regime changes and determine regime-specific dynamics in the credit-
output nexus.
In our application, we apply a two-regime bivariate logistic Vector STAR model which is
governed by a single transition function. It is defined as follows:
yt = Φ
′zt + Ψ′Gt(.)zt + εt (8)
where yt = {GDPt, crt} is a 2×1 column vector, where quarterly GDP and credit growth
are endogenous variables. zt = (1,y
′
t−1, . . . ,y
′
t−p)
′ is a vector of endogenous variables and
a constant. Φ′ and Ψ′ are coefficient matrices of dimension (pk + 1) × k, where k = 2.
The error term εt is assumed to be white noise with variance-covariance matrix Ω.
In our application, we model the special case where one transition function governs the
whole Vector STAR system: Gt(.) = g(st|γ, c)Ik. The transition function is of logistic
type and looks as follows:
g(st|γ, c) = [1 + exp(−γ(st − c))]−1, γ > 0. (9)
It is bounded between zero and one, is monotonically increasing in st, and depends on
the transition speed (γ), the threshold (c) as well as the transition variable (st). The
transition variable is either contemporaneous or the lagged first difference of excess debt
in the banking sector of the respective country or the country group. If γ →∞, the model
converges to a threshold VAR model and if γ approaches zero it collapses to a linear VAR
model. The location parameter c defines the threshold. We expect that a value around
zero should be found by the optimization procedure as zero divides periods of increasing
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and decreasing overleveraging of banks.25
4.3 Results
In the following, we estimate country-group-specific bivariate Vector STAR models based
on quarterly GDP and credit growth with changes in excess leveraging compared to the
previous quarter as exogenous transition variable. Using the first difference emphasizes
debt dynamics in the banking sector.26 The first regime includes debt changes toward
an (even) healthier level, i.e. a reduction of overleveraging (debt) in the banking sector;
the second regime captures increases in debt in the banking sector, i.e. a rise toward
higher (actual − optimal) debt, either above the optimal level or at least closer to it. To
derive structural responses, we use a Cholesky decomposition where credit growth reacts
to GDP shocks within the same quarter and GDP growth responds sluggishly to credit
shocks. Linearity tests point toward a non-linear model and support our expectation of
regime-specific dynamics in the credit–output nexus, see Table 4.
Table 4: Linearity tests, Rao’s test-statistic
EUR EU EA EA-n EA-s PIIGS
p-val. 0.0621 0.0473 0.0230 0.0616 0.0003 0.0003
lag of st 2 2 3 3 3 3
The linearity test is implemented following Tera¨svirta and Yang (2014a).
Granger causality tests based on the estimated Vector STAR models indicate a significant
interdependent GDP and credit growth relation for Europe, the EU, the EA, and the
PIIGS countries.27 However, neither GDP nor credit growth seem to contain statistical
relevant information for the future behavior of the other variable in the northern countries
of the euro area. This questions the estimation of a bivariate Vector STAR model for EA-n.
We will estimate the model nevertheless later on, but we should interpret the results with
caution for that country group. Note also that credit does not seem to help forecasting
GDP for EA-s, but GDP is statistically relevant for the future evolution of credit.
Table 5: Granger Causality, VSTAR model, Rao’s test-statistic and p-values
EUR EU EA EA-n EA-s PIIGS
credit → GDP test-stat. 10.29 9.89 4.63 0.26 0.41 6.91
p-val. 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.61 0.53 0.01
GDP → credit test-stat. 13.17 12.31 9.23 1.70 14.38 7.76
p-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01
Estimation period of VSTAR model, 1998Q1–2012Q4;
x → (Granger causes) y
In the following, we compute (non-linear) impulse response functions based on the method
of Koop et al. (1996) that are able to capture regime-specific effects of shocks. Recent
25Similar and more detailed descriptions of Vector STAR models and their estimation can be found in
Tera¨svirta and Yang (2014b), Schleer (2013), and Schleer and Semmler (2013) for an application.
26Using the level of excess debt would imply to model basically a structural break for most countries
about 1996. Moreover, the level might not be stationary for some country group.
27Estimates for c and γ can be found in the Appendix C in Table A.2.
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studies by Gilchrist and Mojon (2014), Bassett et al. (2014), Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda
(2014), Avdjiev and Zeng (2014), Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), Hristov et al. (2012),
Serwa (2012), Helbling et al. (2011), de Bondt et al. (2010), Gilchrist et al. (2009), Alessan-
dro and Joa˜o (2006), and Balke (2000), to name a few, also analyze the link between
credit dynamics and economic activity in one way or another. Connecting overleveraging
of banks, bank lending to the private sector, and output dynamics in a regime change
model is a novel feature of our study.
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Figure 7: Response of credit to a negative 1 s.d. credit shock
After a negative one standard deviation shock to bank lending, we find asymmetric re-
sponses depending on the debt-regime of the banking sector, see Figure 7. The response
of credit is—irrespective of the regime—negative, but more severe when the shock occurs
during a period of increasing leveraging in the banking sector. The response is long-
lasting and persistently negative which is contrary to a regime of easing banking sector
debt levels. The response of credit is initially negative but shows a slight upward trend
three quarters after the shock.28
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Figure 8: Response of GDP to a negative 1 s.d. credit shock
Thus, bank lending is able to recover when the debt level in the banking sector tends to
be on a sustainable path. When the debt level moves away from being optimal, however,
bank lending will be constrained greatly after a shock to lending. This holds particularly
28The euro area south shows a stronger credit contraction in a regime of relaxing debt levels. The
IRFs, however, allow for regime-switching after the initial shock. Thus, an immediate switch to the
excess-debt-regime might create this unexpected severe reduction.
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for the periphery countries of the euro area and the so-called crisis countries (PIIGS). For
these countries, we find a 2% lower level of credit supply.
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Figure 9: Response of GDP to a negative 1 s.d. GDP shock
GDP also reacts in a non-linear way after a negative shock to credit, see Figure 8. In-
terestingly, we cannot detect a negative response of GDP in a regime of reasonable or
decreasing debt levels. A negative credit shock does not appear to have negative output
consequences after bank lending is constrained. In a regime of increasing debt levels of
the banking sector, however, output will be adversely affected. Eight quarters after a
shock to credit supply, GDP is clearly on a lower level than before. It is reduced by ap-
proximately 0.1% for Europe as well as the northern countries of the euro area. A credit
shock, however, is more harmful for the EA-s as well as PIIGS, where GDP is around
0.2%–0.4% lower. This result is in line with recent experiences, as these countries also
suffer to a greater extent from a credit crunch related to the financial and economic crisis,
although the effects are not so strong in quantitative terms.
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Figure 10: Response of credit to a negative 1 s.d. GDP shock
A negative shock to GDP has a negative impact on GDP and credit irrespective of the
regime for all country groups. The magnitude of this effect, however, differs with respect
to the regime and the country group. Output is specifically adversely affected again
for the periphery countries of the euro area when there is overleveraging in the banking
sector. For instance, a negative shock causes GDP to drop by more than 3% for EA-s
when overleveraging tends to pose a threat to the banking sector.29
29GDP is surprisingly strongly reduced for the EA and the EA-n in a regime when there is an easing of
the banking sector debt level. This may be due to significant spillover and contagion effects in Europe.
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Figure 10 shows that a negative GDP shock results in a severe credit crunch when the
banking sector is overleveraged or has steadily increasing debt levels. Banks greatly
constrain their lending to the private sector: by more than 5% in EA-s and 3% in the
crisis countries (PIIGS); EA, EUR, and EU by around 2%, and in the EA-n only by 1%.
The shock is more severe in times of excess debt in the banking sector, as then a (credit)
bubble may burst, and increasing credits spreads may lead to a deterioration in bank
lending. Credit flows are constrained less in a regime when the leverage ratio moves in
a healthier region. Except for the euro area, the adverse credit effect of a negative GDP
shock diminishes after four quarters.
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5 Conclusions
Overleveraging of the banking sector exposes the financial sector and the macroeconomy
to vulnerabilities but also, as critics state, seems to constrain credit flows to the private
sector. We introduce a dynamic model on optimal or sustainable leveraging. We then
present a measure of overleveraging defined as the difference of actual and sustainable
debt. Furthermore, we conduct an empirical study on overleveraging for 40 banks in
Europe, and study the vulnerabilities of banks, their risk premia, and credit and output
contractions that can arise subsequently.
Before the period 2004 overleveraging does not seem to pose a serious problem and lever-
aging was on a sustainable path. However, in the run-up to the financial crisis actual and
optimal debt diverged and the banking sector began to suffer from overleveraging. This
can be interpreted as an early indicator of a coming vulnerability of banks, sudden rise
in credit spreads, and a credit crisis.
We use a non-linear VSTAR model to evaluate the hypothesis that periods of high lever-
aging are accompanied by more severe credit and output contractions than periods of
decreasing leveraging. We demonstrate this for country groups in Europe. Bank lending
is able to recover after a shock to lending when the debt level in the banking sector tends
to be on a sustainable path. When the debt level moves away from being optimal, how-
ever, bank lending will be constrained greatly. This holds particularly for the periphery
countries of the euro area and the so-called crisis countries (PIIGS). GDP reacts also in
a non-linear way after a negative shock to credit. In a regime of increasing debt levels of
the banking sector, output will be adversely affected. A credit shock, however, is more
harmful for the EA-s as well as PIIGS.
Moreover, a negative output shock results in a severe credit crunch when the banking
sector is overleveraged or has steadily increasing debt levels. Banks greatly constrain their
lending to the private sector: by more than 5% in EA-s and 3% in the crisis countries
(PIIGS); EA, EUR, and EU by around 2%, and in the EA-n only by 1%. The shock is
more severe in times of excess debt in the banking sector, as then a (credit) bubble may
burst, and increasing credits spreads may lead to a deterioration in bank lending.
Our analysis has implications for the new regulatory requirements set out by the BIS. Our
study shows that one can largely agree with Admati and Hellwig (2013) that given the
still overleveraged EU banking sector and the planned EU banking union higher capital
requirements are essential to allow for the stability of the EU banking system and their
provision of the credit flows for the public and private sector. In future work, it might
be interesting to compare our methodology measuring overleveraging to the methodology
used by the ECB in their recent stress-tests.
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Appendix: Numerics, derivation of optimal debt, and
additional results
A The numerical procedure
For the numerical solution of our dynamic decision problem we employ a new proce-
dure.30 Usually one uses DYNARE or Dynamic Programming (DP) to solve models such
as presented in Section 2 (see Gru¨ne and Semmler 2004). DYNARE undertakes some lin-
earization and eliminates the non-linearities. The disadvantage of DP is that its numerical
effort typically grows exponentially with the dimension of the state variable. Hence, even
for moderate state dimensions it may be impossible to compute a solution with reasonable
accuracy. A remedy to this problem can be obtained by using non-linear model predictive
control (NMPC) (Gru¨ne et al. 2013). Instead of computing the optimal value function
for all possible initial states, NMPC only computes single trajectories.
In order to describe the method, let us abstractly write the dynamic decision problem as
maximize
ˆ T
0
e−ρt`(x(t), u(t))dt, (A.1)
where x(t) satisfies x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0 and the maximization takes place over
a set of admissible decision functions. By discretizing this problem in time, we obtain an
approximate discrete time problem of the form
maximize
T∑
i=0
βi`(xi, ui)dt, (A.2)
where the maximization is now performed over a sequence ui of decision values and the
sequence xi satisfies xi+1 = Φ(h, xi, ui). Here h > 0 is the discretization time step,
β = e−ρh and Φ is a numerical scheme approximating the solution of x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))
on the time interval [ih, (i + 1)h]. For details and references in which the error of this
discretization is analyzed we refer to Gru¨ne et al. (2013).
The idea of NMPC now lies in replacing the maximization of the above large horizon
functional, where we could have T → ∞, by the iterative maximization of finite horizon
functionals
maximize
N∑
k=0
βi`(xk,i, uk,i)dt, (A.3)
for a truncated finite horizon N ∈ N with xk+1,i = Φ(h, xk,i, uk,i) and the index i indicates
the number of the iteration, cf. the algorithm below. Note that neither β nor ` nor Φ
changes when passing from (A.2) to (A.3), only the horizon is truncated.
Problems of type (A.3) can be efficiently solved numerically by converting them into a
static non-linear program and solving them by efficient NLP solvers, cf. Gru¨ne and Pannek
(2011). In our simulations, we use a discounted variant of the MATLAB routine which
uses MATLAB’s fmincon NLP solver in order to solve the resulting static optimization
30The description can also be found in Schleer and Semmler (2013) and Proano et al. (2014).
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problem.
Given an initial value x0, an approximate solution of (A.2) can now be obtained by
iteratively solving (A.3) as follows:
(1) for i=1,2,3,. . .
(2) solve (A.3) with initial value x0,i := xi and denote the
resulting optimal control sequence by u∗k,i
(3) set ui := u
∗
0,i and xi+1 := Φ(h, xi, ui)
(4) end of for-loop
This algorithm yields an infinite trajectory xi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . whose control sequence
ui consists of all the first elements u
∗
0,i of the decision sequences for the finite horizon
subproblems (A.3).
Under appropriate assumptions on the problem, it can be shown that the solution (xi, ui)
(which depends on the choice of N above) converges to the correct solution of (A.2) as
N → ∞. The main requirement in these assumptions is the existence of an equilibrium
for the infinite horizon problem (A.2). If this equilibrium is known, it can be used as an
additional constraint in (A.3), in order to improve the convergence properties. However,
recent results have shown that without a priori knowledge of this equilibrium this conver-
gence can also be ensured, see Gru¨ne et al. (2013), and this is the approach we use in the
computations in this paper. It should be noted that the references just cited treat aver-
aged instead of discounted infinite horizon problems. However, Gru¨ne and Pannek (2011)
conjectures that the main arguments carry over to the discounted case details which will
be addressed in future research. In any case, the solution generated by NMPC will always
provide a lower bound for the true optimal solution.
B Computation of the optimal debt
Stein (2012, Ch.4.9) shows how the optimal debt ratio can be derived in the simplified
case of logarithmic utility. The notation and description in this subsection is taken from
Stein (2012, Ch.4.9, pp.71–73).
The stochastic differential equation for net worth is (A.4)
dX(t) = X(t)[(1 + f(t))(dP (t)/P (t) + β(t)dt)− i(t)f(t)− cdt] (A.4)
X(t) denotes net worth, f(t) = L(t)/X(t) debt over net worth, dP (t)/P (t) = capital
gain or loss, stochastic, i(t) = interest rate, also stochastic, (1 + f(t)) = assets over net
worth, β(t) = productivity of capital.31 Moreover, c(t) = C(t)/X(t), consumption over
net worth, where c is fixed. Let the price evolve stochastically as
dP (t) = P (t)(a(t)dt+ σpdwp) (A.5)
where Stein (2012) shows two different version—Model I or Model II—for the drift a(t),
which will be briefly explained below. The interest rate also evolves as a stochastic process.
31Subsequently, we will use a β(t) that will represent trend productivity.
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i(t) = idt+ σidwi. (A.6)
Then, substitute (A.5) and (A.6) in (A.4) and derive (A.8)
dX(t) = X(t)[(1 + f(t))(a(t)dt+ β(t)dt)− (if(t)dt+ c dt)] + [(1 + f(t))σpdwp−σif(t)dwi]
(A.7)
dX(t) = X(t)M((t)dt+X(t)B(f(t)). (A.8)
The mean (A.9) and risk (A.12) term are defined as follows, where B(t) in (A.10) contains
stochastic variables (see also Stein (2012, Ch.4.5)):
Mean = M(f(t)) = [(1 + f(t)(a(t)dt+ β(t))dt− (if(t) + c)] (A.9)
B(t) = [(1 + f(t))σpdwp − σif(t)dwi] (A.10)
B2(f(t)) = (1 + f(t)2σ2pdt+ f(t)
2σ2i dt− 2f(t)(1 + f(t))σiσpdwpdwi (A.11)
Risk = R(f(t)) = (
1
2
)[(1 + f(t))2σ2b + f(t)
2σ2i − 2(t)(1 + f(t))σbσiρ)] (A.12)
M(f(t)) contains the deterministic terms and B(f(t)) contains the stochastic terms. To
solve for X(t) consider the change in lnX(t), see (A.13). This is based upon the Ito
equation of the stochastic calculus. As Stein (2012) shows using the logarithmic criterion
implies that one does not need to use dynamic programming. The expectation of d lnX(t)
is (A.14).
dlnX(t) = (1/X(t))dX(t)− (1/2X(t)2)(dX(t))2 (A.13)
E[d(lnX(t))] = [M((t)]−R[((t)]dt] (A.14)
Equ. (A.14) represents a mean-variance formulation. The correlation ρ dt = E(dwpdwi)
is negative, which increases risk, where (dt)2 = 0, dwdt = 0.
The optimal debt ratio f ∗ maximizes the difference between the mean and risk.
f ∗ = argmax[M(f(t))−R(f(t))] = [(a(t) + β(t)− i)− (σ2p − ρσiσb)]/σ2 (A.15)
σ2 = σ2i + σ
2
p − 2ρσiσp (A.16)
Model I assumes mean reversion so that the price P (t) has a trend rt and a deviation y(t)
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from it (A.17).32 The deviation y(t) for Model I follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck ergodic
mean reverting process (A.18). Coefficient α is positive and finite.
P (t) = P (0)exp[rt+ y(t)] (A.17)
dy(t) = −αy(t) + σpdwp (A.18)
Therefore using the stochastic calculus a(t) in Model I is the first term in (A.19)
dP (t)/P (t) = (r − αy(t) + (1
2
σ2p
)
)dt+ σpdwp. (A.19)
Then, substitute (A.19) in (A.15) and derive (A.20), which is the optimal debt ratio in
Model I.
f ∗(t) = [(r − i) + β − αy(t)− 1
2
σ2p + ρσiσp]/σ
2 (A.20)
Hereby, β(t) is considered as deterministic.
32Stein’s second model variant (Model II) assumes a random walk for the capital gains with expected
value of zero. In our empirical application for the specific (finite) sample, there may be capital gains
which are on average slightly different from zero. Thus, Model I appears to be more reasonable.
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C Additional results and results of individual banks
Table A.1: Correlation between group specific interbank rate spreads and the measure of
(over-)leveraging in the banking sector
EUR EU EA EA-n EA-s PIIGS
0.5066 0.4484 0.5607 0.2407 0.7918 0.7808
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Figure A.1: Interbank rate spreads and the measure of (over-)leveraging in the banking sector,
EA-n and ES-s
Table A.2: Estimates for c and γ
EUR EU EA EA-n EA-s PIIGS
c 0.0299 0.0180 -0.0797 -0.0651 -0.0008 0.0061
γ 6.8431 5.1350 2.3336 1.7254 30.0000 30.0000
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Figure A.2: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country aggregates I
Figure A.3: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country aggregates II
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Figure A.4: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country aggregates III
Figure A.5: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country aggregates IV
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Figure A.6: Actual vs. Optimal Debt, country aggregates V
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Table A.3: Results of individual banks33
Erste Group Dexia KBC Danske Bank Jyske Bank
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 -0.57 0.99 2.09 1.10 2.00 1.66 -0.34 1.09 -1.15 -2.24 0.75 -1.22 -1.97
1998 -0.19 -0.49 -0.30 1.11 1.94 0.83 1.28 1.22 -0.06 0.59 -0.92 -1.51 0.01 -1.21 -1.22
1999 -0.28 3.54 3.82 1.08 0.73 -0.35 0.29 1.33 1.04 0.84 -1.00 -1.84 -0.80 -0.99 -0.19
2000 0.10 -0.37 -0.47 0.79 -1.22 -2.01 -0.86 -0.52 0.34 1.11 2.55 1.44 -0.04 1.40 1.44
2001 0.43 -0.39 -0.82 0.31 -1.21 -1.52 -0.54 -1.08 -0.54 0.63 1.19 0.56 -0.01 2.05 2.06
2002 0.72 -0.52 -1.24 0.09 -1.24 -1.33 -0.38 -1.03 -0.65 -0.59 0.58 1.17 0.55 1.93 1.38
2003 1.20 -0.29 -1.49 0.17 0.30 0.13 0.36 -1.35 -1.71 -0.38 -0.06 0.32 0.92 -0.39 -1.31
2004 1.56 0.01 -1.55 0.56 0.21 -0.35 0.97 -1.69 -2.66 0.42 -0.74 -1.16 1.63 0.08 -1.55
2005 1.38 -0.53 -1.91 0.54 -0.17 -0.71 0.90 0.03 -0.87 0.85 -0.60 -1.45 1.19 -0.07 -1.26
2006 0.57 -0.46 -1.03 0.46 -0.36 -0.82 0.42 0.98 0.56 0.23 0.02 -0.21 0.60 0.31 -0.29
2007 -1.42 -0.42 1.00 -0.19 -0.56 -0.37 -1.05 0.45 1.50 -1.97 -0.14 1.83 -1.66 0.08 1.74
2008 -1.70 -0.11 1.59 -0.42 -0.45 -0.03 -1.71 0.17 1.88 -2.14 -0.23 1.91 -1.98 -0.26 1.72
2009 -0.70 -0.39 0.31 -0.62 -0.16 0.46 -1.29 0.42 1.71 -1.00 -1.02 -0.02 -1.12 -0.25 0.87
2010 0.13 0.52 0.39 -0.65 -0.13 0.52 -0.38 0.23 0.61 0.47 0.73 0.26 0.13 -0.39 -0.52
2011 -1.06 0.35 1.41 -1.85 -0.57 1.28 -0.36 -0.60 -0.24 -0.13 -0.19 -0.06 -0.41 -0.43 -0.02
2012 -0.74 0.13 0.87 -2.37 0.81 3.18 0.35 -0.22 -0.57 -0.05 0.99 1.04 0.24 -0.65 -0.89
Bank Pohjola BNP Paribas Cre´dit Agricole Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale Commerzbank
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 1.41 -0.63 -2.04 1.23 0.90 -0.33 1.30 1.17 0.23 -0.94 1.04 0.93 -0.11
1998 0.56 -0.72 -1.28 2.25 0.51 -1.74 0.81 1.34 0.15 -1.19 0.91 0.32 -0.59
1999 0.04 -0.94 -0.98 1.64 -0.10 -1.74 -0.11 0.94 0.67 -0.27 0.17 -0.01 -0.18
2000 -0.14 -0.63 -0.49 0.55 0.84 0.29 -1.57 0.71 3.45 2.74 -0.26 0.30 0.56
2001 -0.30 -0.77 -0.47 -0.55 -0.65 -0.10 1.06 -0.10 -0.57 -0.47 -1.73 0.57 2.30
2002 -0.60 -0.97 -0.37 -0.72 -0.15 0.57 1.12 -0.02 -1.14 -0.40 -0.53 -0.13 -1.10 -0.94 0.16
2003 0.06 0.76 0.70 -0.60 -0.79 -0.19 1.02 -1.50 -2.52 -0.03 -0.59 -0.56 -0.21 -0.59 -0.38
2004 1.80 1.07 -0.73 0.19 -0.94 -1.13 1.15 -1.70 -2.85 0.92 -0.63 -1.55 1.53 -0.86 -2.39
2005 1.62 1.35 -0.27 0.44 -0.52 -0.96 1.08 -0.26 -1.34 1.12 0.35 -0.77 1.10 -0.87 -1.97
2006 0.53 2.24 1.71 0.16 -2.39 -2.55 0.63 -0.46 -1.09 0.69 0.06 -0.63 0.88 1.27 0.39
2007 -1.45 -1.16 0.29 -1.03 0.39 1.42 -0.79 1.07 1.86 -1.29 -0.42 0.87 -0.99 2.01 3.00
2008 -1.69 -0.29 1.40 -1.03 -1.06 -0.03 -1.13 0.39 1.52 -1.57 -0.28 1.29 -1.47 1.38 2.85
2009 -0.87 1.09 1.96 -0.55 0.81 1.36 -0.74 -0.56 0.18 -0.94 -0.48 0.46 -0.72 -0.97 -0.25
2010 -0.33 -0.15 0.18 -0.41 1.04 1.45 -0.57 -0.37 0.20 -0.70 -0.51 0.19 0.77 -1.07 -1.84
2011 -0.46 -0.18 0.28 -1.07 1.09 2.16 -1.38 0.80 2.18 -1.41 -0.43 0.98 0.31 -0.45 -0.76
2012 -0.19 -0.07 0.12 -0.50 1.03 1.53 -0.39 1.13 1.52 -0.46 -0.46 0.00 -0.20 -1.01 -0.81
Deutsche Bank Alpha Bank Eurobank Ergasias NB of Greece Piraeus Bank
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 1.22 0.54 -0.68 1.34 -0.88 -2.22 -0.23 -1.15 -0.92 1.59 -0.11 -1.70 1.77 -0.53 -2.30
1998 1.30 0.28 -1.02 1.38 -0.85 -2.23 2.32 -1.20 -3.52 1.65 -0.26 -1.91 1.76 -0.61 -2.37
1999 0.96 0.93 -0.03 0.78 -0.85 -1.63 1.28 -1.20 -2.48 0.86 -0.59 -1.45 0.89 -0.62 -1.51
2000 0.69 1.08 0.39 -0.17 -0.82 -0.65 -0.26 -1.07 -0.81 -0.29 -0.78 -0.49 -0.52 -0.58 -0.06
2001 -1.05 2.41 3.46 -1.15 -0.82 0.33 -0.56 -0.86 -0.30 -1.19 -0.90 0.29 -1.02 -0.48 0.54
2002 -1.50 0.60 2.10 -0.54 -0.61 -0.07 -0.30 -0.75 -0.45 -0.85 -0.39 0.46 -0.58 -0.34 0.24
2003 -0.73 -0.05 0.68 0.41 0.33 -0.08 0.33 0.18 -0.15 0.00 -0.39 -0.39 0.03 0.24 0.21
2004 0.64 0.25 -0.39 1.09 1.61 0.52 0.77 1.51 0.74 0.96 0.53 -0.43 0.53 -0.23 -0.76
2005 0.72 -0.16 -0.88 0.71 1.11 0.40 0.62 1.36 0.74 0.85 0.33 -0.52 0.51 3.01 2.50
2006 0.75 -0.10 -0.85 0.45 2.34 1.89 0.44 1.66 1.22 0.66 0.61 -0.05 0.45 1.80 1.35
2007 -1.54 -0.90 0.64 -0.49 0.65 1.14 -0.54 0.84 1.38 -0.41 0.05 0.46 -0.40 0.18 0.58
2008 -1.30 -1.56 -0.26 -0.79 -0.73 0.06 -0.86 0.41 1.27 -0.53 -0.42 0.11 -0.88 -0.21 0.67
2009 -0.25 -0.44 -0.19 -1.23 0.07 1.30 -1.24 0.65 1.89 -0.88 -0.11 0.77 -1.27 -0.20 1.07
2010 0.80 -0.65 -1.45 -1.43 -0.14 1.29 -1.42 0.08 1.50 -1.10 -0.20 0.90 -1.19 -0.42 0.77
2011 -0.47 -1.08 -0.61 -1.30 0.36 1.66 -1.05 -0.30 0.75 -1.49 3.37 4.86 -0.95 -0.38 0.57
2012 -0.25 -1.15 -0.90 0.94 -0.75 -1.69 0.70 -0.16 -0.86 0.16 -0.74 -0.90 0.86 -0.62 -1.48
Bank of Ireland Banca Monte Paschi Intesa Sanpaolo UniCredit ING Groep
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 1.36 -0.87 -2.23 -1.37 1.83 -1.97 -3.80 2.06 -0.86 -2.92 1.92 -0.92 -2.84
1998 0.89 -0.82 -1.71 -1.21 2.36 -0.37 -2.73 1.90 -0.55 -2.45 1.19 2.01 0.82
1999 0.15 -0.79 -0.94 -1.27 0.94 -1.09 -2.03 0.62 -0.57 -1.19 0.77 2.07 1.30
2000 0.12 -0.77 -0.89 0.25 -1.01 -1.26 -0.28 -1.13 -0.85 -0.27 -0.84 -0.57 0.22 1.74 1.52
2001 0.40 -0.48 -0.88 0.10 -0.63 -0.73 -0.80 -0.93 -0.13 -0.21 -0.86 -0.65 -0.64 -0.22 0.42
2002 0.08 -0.60 -0.68 -0.16 -0.69 -0.53 -0.85 -0.66 0.19 -0.40 -1.16 -0.76 -1.17 -0.25 0.92
2003 -0.05 -0.58 -0.53 0.34 -0.01 -0.35 -0.33 -0.28 0.05 -0.16 -1.48 -1.32 -0.42 0.21 0.63
2004 0.23 -0.52 -0.75 1.24 -0.02 -1.26 0.26 -0.32 -0.58 0.52 -0.86 -1.38 0.81 -0.40 -1.21
2005 0.47 -0.57 -1.04 1.58 0.69 -0.89 0.31 0.40 0.09 0.77 0.11 -0.66 0.88 -0.62 -1.50
2006 0.07 1.61 1.54 1.48 0.25 -1.23 0.58 0.87 0.29 0.57 0.45 -0.12 0.30 -0.72 -1.02
2007 -2.04 2.74 4.78 0.06 1.31 1.25 -0.15 0.50 0.65 -0.88 1.10 1.98 -1.35 -0.70 0.65
2008 -2.36 0.69 3.05 -0.70 1.23 1.93 -0.76 0.43 1.19 -1.25 1.45 2.70 -1.69 -0.68 1.01
2009 -0.92 0.26 1.18 -0.73 -0.10 0.63 -0.98 0.92 1.90 -1.06 1.01 2.07 -0.98 -0.54 0.44
2010 1.04 0.35 -0.69 -0.54 -0.11 0.43 -0.68 0.68 1.36 -0.63 0.80 1.43 0.27 -0.43 -0.70
2011 0.10 0.06 -0.04 -1.45 1.35 2.80 -0.89 1.58 2.47 -1.05 1.42 2.47 -0.24 -0.37 -0.13
2012 0.48 0.29 -0.19 -1.46 1.60 3.06 -0.54 1.36 1.90 -0.52 0.83 1.35 0.11 -0.19 -0.30
DNB Spare Bank Bank BPH Mbank Banco Comercial
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 0.65 -2.93 -3.58 0.04 -1.21 -1.25 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 -0.60 -0.91 -0.31 1.69 -2.13 -3.82
1998 -0.01 1.35 1.36 -0.29 -1.67 -1.38 -0.04 -0.65 -0.61 -0.17 0.77 0.94 1.54 -2.21 -3.75
1999 -0.26 -0.59 -0.33 -0.68 -1.46 -0.78 0.19 0.65 0.46 0.17 0.67 0.50 1.32 -0.66 -1.98
2000 -0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.49 -0.71 -0.22 0.42 0.28 -0.14 -0.66 -0.21 0.45 0.75 -0.53 -1.28
2001 -0.38 0.44 0.82 -1.21 -0.15 1.06 0.76 -0.05 -0.81 -1.58 -0.08 1.50 -0.22 -0.05 0.17
2002 0.05 -1.23 -1.28 -0.87 -0.73 0.14 0.82 -0.59 -1.41 -1.14 0.44 1.58 -1.00 0.48 1.48
2003 1.14 0.23 -0.91 0.26 -0.64 -0.90 0.85 0.48 -0.37 -0.20 0.76 0.96 -0.45 0.36 0.81
2004 1.77 0.15 -1.62 1.96 -0.10 -2.06 1.12 1.17 0.05 0.93 0.34 -0.59 0.53 0.37 -0.16
2005 1.03 -0.37 -1.40 0.93 0.44 -0.49 0.49 1.25 0.76 1.48 1.38 -0.10 0.60 0.15 -0.45
2006 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.46 0.47 -1.35 2.52 3.87 2.08 1.70 -0.38 0.59 0.54 -0.05
2007 -2.24 -0.34 1.90 -1.94 0.93 2.87 -2.69 -0.59 2.10 0.24 0.85 0.61 -0.63 0.93 1.56
2008 -1.53 0.85 2.38 -0.76 1.86 2.62 -1.06 -0.73 0.33 -1.24 -1.35 -0.11 -1.14 0.32 1.46
2009 -0.38 0.78 1.16 0.36 0.88 0.52 0.45 -0.71 -1.16 -0.71 -0.98 -0.27 -1.25 0.45 1.70
2010 1.00 0.36 -0.64 1.30 1.01 -0.29 0.78 -0.90 -1.68 0.80 -0.88 -1.68 -0.81 0.01 0.82
2011 -0.57 0.55 1.12 0.51 0.50 -0.01 -0.50 -1.02 -0.52 0.32 -1.36 -1.68 -1.07 0.33 1.40
2012 -0.24 0.68 0.92 0.90 0.61 -0.29 -0.20 -0.98 -0.78 0.27 -1.14 -1.41 -0.44 1.66 2.10
33OD = optimal debt, AD = actual debt, A-O = (actual - optimal debt)
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Banco Espirito Santo34 BPI Banco Popular BBVA Santander
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 2.26 -2.22 -4.48 1.87 -2.07 -3.94 1.43 -1.45 -2.88 2.18 -1.74 -3.92 1.87 -1.30 -3.17
1998 1.52 -1.48 -3.00 1.36 -1.06 -2.42 0.92 -1.10 -2.02 1.51 -1.53 -3.04 2.03 -0.97 -3.00
1999 0.20 -0.89 -1.09 0.22 -1.19 -1.41 -0.07 -0.64 -0.57 0.97 -1.40 -2.37 1.18 -0.67 -1.85
2000 -0.44 -0.48 -0.04 -0.49 -1.08 -0.59 0.14 -1.33 -1.47 0.31 -0.60 -0.91 0.22 -0.91 -1.13
2001 -0.21 0.08 0.29 -0.45 -0.42 0.03 0.35 -1.03 -1.38 -0.63 -0.64 -0.01 -1.00 -0.92 0.08
2002 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.21 -0.02 0.19 0.37 -0.92 -1.29 -1.18 -0.50 0.68 -0.95 -0.58 0.37
2003 0.33 1.49 1.16 0.44 0.33 -0.11 0.37 -0.14 -0.51 -0.43 -0.25 0.18 -0.18 -0.27 -0.09
2004 0.15 0.63 0.48 0.71 0.18 -0.53 0.60 0.17 -0.43 0.52 0.07 -0.45 0.68 -0.18 -0.86
2005 0.65 1.29 0.64 1.06 0.51 -0.55 0.85 1.56 0.71 0.69 0.92 0.23 0.34 0.91 0.57
2006 1.02 0.58 -0.44 0.79 1.12 0.33 0.51 0.45 -0.06 0.27 1.31 1.04 0.17 1.83 1.66
2007 -0.49 0.63 1.12 -0.94 0.96 1.90 -1.18 1.43 2.61 -1.04 0.95 1.99 -0.63 2.04 2.67
2008 -1.02 0.74 1.76 -1.47 0.17 1.64 -2.06 1.02 3.08 -1.25 1.16 2.41 -0.72 0.98 1.70
2009 -1.35 0.68 2.03 -1.39 2.01 3.40 -2.04 0.59 2.63 -0.91 1.12 2.03 -0.79 0.40 1.19
2010 -0.74 0.24 0.98 -1.02 0.23 1.25 -0.52 0.47 0.99 -0.22 0.62 0.84 -0.50 0.19 0.69
2011 -1.36 -0.55 0.81 -0.78 -0.01 0.77 -0.17 1.11 1.28 -0.76 0.30 1.06 -1.12 0.02 1.14
2012 -0.44 -0.67 -0.23 0.28 0.35 0.07 0.50 -0.19 -0.69 -0.04 0.20 0.24 -0.62 -0.56 0.06
Nordea Svenska Handelsb. Swedbank Credit Suisse UBS
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 2.72 1.42 -1.30 2.45 -1.11 -3.56 1.95 0.42 -1.53 2.01 -0.89 -2.90 0.58 -0.86 -1.44
1998 1.32 0.70 -0.62 0.93 0.53 -0.40 0.63 0.65 0.02 1.47 -0.57 -2.04 0.95 -0.72 -1.67
1999 0.73 1.31 0.58 0.43 0.52 0.09 -0.47 0.27 0.74 0.66 -0.84 -1.50 0.64 -0.59 -1.23
2000 -0.23 1.38 1.61 0.19 -1.21 -1.40 -0.72 -0.53 0.19 0.15 -1.24 -1.39 0.07 1.33 1.26
2001 -0.63 1.29 1.92 -0.38 -1.42 -1.04 -0.79 0.60 1.39 -1.29 -0.90 0.39 -0.30 -1.47 -1.17
2002 -1.43 0.06 1.49 -1.25 -1.14 0.11 -0.72 0.30 1.02 -1.18 -0.63 0.55 -0.37 -0.96 -0.59
2003 -0.63 -0.32 0.31 -0.70 -0.59 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.22 -0.59 -0.51 0.08 0.24 -1.20 -1.44
2004 0.40 -0.50 -0.90 0.33 -0.48 -0.81 0.70 -1.32 -2.02 1.01 -0.37 -1.38 1.23 -0.81 -2.04
2005 0.54 -0.29 -0.83 0.27 -0.91 -1.18 0.64 -0.92 -1.56 0.79 -0.29 -1.08 1.27 -0.09 -1.36
2006 0.22 -0.21 -0.43 -0.22 0.08 0.30 0.28 -1.34 -1.62 0.67 0.06 -0.61 0.72 0.12 -0.60
2007 -0.81 -0.38 0.43 -1.81 0.79 2.60 -1.54 -1.52 0.02 -0.72 -0.10 0.62 -1.83 0.21 2.04
2008 -0.65 0.56 1.21 -1.26 0.26 1.52 -1.74 -1.11 0.63 -0.65 0.21 0.86 -2.20 0.08 2.28
2009 -0.36 -1.21 -0.85 -0.14 1.10 1.24 -0.53 0.63 1.16 -0.47 0.82 1.29 -1.00 1.48 2.48
2010 -0.08 -1.28 -1.20 0.62 1.75 1.13 1.23 0.64 -0.59 -0.51 1.93 2.44 0.07 1.19 1.12
2011 -0.78 -1.29 -0.51 0.05 0.44 0.39 0.66 1.65 0.99 -1.19 1.56 2.75 -0.37 1.36 1.73
2012 -0.35 -1.23 -0.88 0.50 1.37 0.87 0.51 1.46 0.95 -0.16 1.74 1.90 0.30 0.94 0.64
Barclays HSBC Lloyds RBS Standard Chartered
OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O OD AD A-O
1997 1.40 -1.24 -2.64 1.13 -0.55 -1.68 2.12 -1.02 -3.14 0.50 -0.85 -1.35 -0.24 -0.78 -0.54
1998 1.06 -1.11 -2.17 1.37 -0.46 -1.83 1.09 -1.04 -2.13 1.42 -0.46 -1.88 -0.38 -0.90 -0.52
1999 0.22 -0.95 -1.17 1.53 -0.41 -1.94 -0.64 -0.65 -0.01 1.91 -0.10 -2.01 -0.10 -0.60 -0.50
2000 0.81 0.12 -0.69 1.19 -0.43 -1.62 -0.57 -0.64 -0.07 1.89 -0.95 -2.84 -0.48 -0.56 -0.08
2001 -0.10 0.25 0.35 -0.68 -0.62 0.06 -0.84 -0.75 0.09 0.66 -0.80 -1.46 -1.53 -0.81 0.72
2002 -0.54 0.43 0.97 -0.90 -0.46 0.44 -1.18 -0.52 0.66 -0.19 -0.89 -0.70 -1.41 -0.71 0.70
2003 -0.46 1.67 2.13 0.28 2.24 1.96 -1.24 -0.37 0.87 -0.37 -0.68 -0.31 -0.14 -0.63 -0.49
2004 0.60 1.50 0.90 0.76 2.15 1.39 -0.03 -0.46 -0.43 -0.21 -0.71 -0.50 1.30 -0.60 -1.90
2005 0.58 -0.55 -1.13 -0.13 0.76 0.89 0.45 -0.51 -0.96 -0.25 2.20 2.45 1.22 3.08 1.86
2006 -0.03 -0.62 -0.59 -0.76 1.02 1.78 0.22 -0.52 -0.74 -0.11 2.28 2.39 1.45 0.81 -0.64
2007 -2.58 -0.69 1.89 -1.90 0.07 1.97 -1.30 0.15 1.45 -0.67 0.06 0.73 -0.62 0.70 1.32
2008 -1.26 -0.87 0.39 -1.14 -0.52 0.62 0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -1.09 -0.24 0.85 0.13 0.02 -0.11
2009 -0.15 0.17 0.32 0.08 -0.53 -0.61 1.26 1.70 0.44 -1.04 0.46 1.50 0.85 0.25 -0.60
2010 0.80 0.02 -0.78 0.05 -0.64 -0.69 0.85 1.83 0.98 -0.68 0.65 1.33 1.52 -0.01 -1.53
2011 -0.90 -0.15 0.75 -0.81 -0.69 0.12 -0.72 1.64 2.36 -1.01 0.03 1.04 -0.42 0.27 0.69
2012 0.56 2.02 1.46 -0.06 -0.93 -0.87 0.45 1.18 0.73 -0.74 -0.01 0.73 -1.15 0.47 1.62
34Note that Banco Espirito Santo has been split into a ”bad bank” and a ”good bank”, now called
Novo Banco, in August 2014.
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